Financial institutions lead commercial policy containment, with 90.0% maintaining valid SPF and 50.0% operating at p=quarantine. However, only 10.0% have progressed to full p=reject enforcement, while 30.0% lack DMARC entirely and 10.0% remain at p=none. Furthermore, complete non-adoption of MTA-STS (0.0%) and DNSSEC (0.0%) leaves interbank transaction notices and customer communications susceptible to interception.
Rwandan governmental agencies display exemplary DMARC deployment, with only 2.9% omitting records and 94.3% validating SPF correctly. However, policy progression is heavily concentrated at p=quarantine (61.4%) and passive p=none observation (34.3%), with only 1.4% reaching strict p=reject. The total absence of DNSSEC (0.0%) and MTA-STS (0.0%) leaves departmental communications vulnerable to transit interception.
Managing sensitive clinical records and laboratory files, healthcare displays a strong quarantine adoption rate (60.0%) and 91.1% SPF validity. However, active rejection is completely absent (0.0% p=reject), with 26.7% lacking DMARC, 11.1% in p=none, and 2.2% suffering configuration errors. Combined with 0.0% MTA-STS and DNSSEC adoption, patient confidentiality faces risks under Law Nº 058/2021.
Higher education and research facilities represent the national leader in strict DMARC rejection (32.7% p=reject), alongside 30.9% in p=quarantine. However, the sector exhibits substantial baseline vulnerability: 45.5% of educational domains omit SPF entirely, and 18.2% omit DMARC. Coupled with 0.0% MTA-STS and minimal DNSSEC (3.6%), academic credentials and research data face ongoing spoofing risks.
Critical utility operators show the strongest baseline SPF validity in the country at 97.0%. Despite this foundation, the transition to active defense is lagging: 45.5% remain parked at passive p=none observation, 36.4% omit DMARC entirely, and only 3.0% enforce p=reject. With 0.0% MTA-STS adoption, utility supply chain notifications remain vulnerable to executive impersonation.
Broadcasters, publishing outlets, and digital news agencies exhibit widespread vulnerability. Half (50.0%) lack a DMARC record entirely, active rejection is non-existent (0.0% p=reject), and 11.1% suffer SPF syntax errors. Zero deployment of MTA-STS (0.0%) or DNSSEC (0.0%) leaves official editorial channels exposed to fake press distribution and credential theft.
Telecom carriers and internet service providers demonstrate flawless baseline SPF hygiene (100.0% correct) and lead the nation in DNSSEC signing (16.7%). However, their DMARC posture is fragmented: 16.6% enforce p=reject, while 41.7% linger in passive p=none observation and 41.7% publish no DMARC record. The absence of MTA-STS (0.0%) leaves carrier automated notifications exposed to transport eavesdropping.
Supporting regional cross-border commerce, logistics operators achieve 90.6% SPF compliance. However, active policy enforcement is limited, with only 6.3% enforcing p=reject and 15.6% applying p=quarantine, while 40.6% remain at p=none and 37.5% omit records. Total absence of MTA-STS (0.0%) leaves shipping documentation, customs clearance forms, and invoices vulnerable to tampering.