A DNS attack is any attack that targets the Domain Name System or abuses it to redirect users, steal data, or take a service offline. Every website visit and email delivery relies on DNS lookups, making DNS infrastructure an attractive target. Because traditional DNS does not inherently authenticate the origin of every response, attackers can exploit weaknesses in resolution, domain administration, and network configuration to disrupt services or deceive users. There are several types of DNS attacks based on what it targets, the attacker’s goals, and prevention methods. In this blog, we will go through the various DNS attack types and how to mitigate them.
What Is a DNS Attack?
A DNS attack is a cyberattack that targets the Domain Name System (DNS) or misuses its normal functions to compromise the availability, integrity, or confidentiality of network services. The Domain Name System (DNS) translates domain names into information, such as IP addresses, that systems use to locate websites, mail servers, and other internet services.
DNS-based attacks generally work in three ways:
- Redirect traffic. Attackers forge DNS responses, compromise DNS settings, or alter domain records to send users to an unintended destination. DNS spoofing and DNS hijacking are examples.
- Abuse DNS as a channel or weapon. DNS tunneling can carry unauthorized communications or stolen data inside DNS queries and responses. DNS amplification uses DNS infrastructure to increase the volume of traffic directed at a victim.
- Overwhelm DNS services. Flood attacks send excessive queries to exhaust server resources. NXDOMAIN attacks use requests for nonexistent names to force repeated lookups and burden DNS infrastructure.
These techniques can affect recursive resolvers, authoritative nameservers, individual devices, domain registrars, or the networks that connect them.
Many attacks succeed because of an existing weakness, such as inadequate access controls, exposed DNS services, or missing security validation.
Types of DNS Attacks at a Glance
The following DNS attacks list summarizes each technique, its target, the attacker’s objective, and a relevant security control.
| Attack type | What it targets | Attacker's goal | Main defense |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. DNS spoofing and cache poisoning | Resolver responses and cache | Redirect users | DNSSEC validation |
| 2. DNS hijacking | Device, router, or domain settings | Change where traffic goes | MFA and registrar lock |
| 3. DNS tunneling | DNS queries and responses | Hide communications or steal data | DNS monitoring and filtering |
| 4. DNS amplification | Exposed DNS resolvers | Multiply attack traffic | Restrict recursion and rate limiting |
| 5. DNS flood attacks | DNS server capacity | Disrupt resolution | DDoS mitigation |
| 6. NXDOMAIN and water torture attacks | DNS lookup resources | Exhaust server capacity | Query filtering and rate limiting |
| 7. Subdomain takeover | Abandoned DNS destinations | Control a trusted subdomain | Remove dangling records |
| 8. On-path DNS attacks | DNS traffic in transit | Intercept or alter queries | Encrypted DNS transport |
| 9. DNS rebinding | Browser access to local networks | Reach internal services | Network isolation and browser controls |
| 10. Typosquatting and look-alike domains | Users and brand identities | Steal credentials or facilitate fraud | Domain monitoring |
10 Common Types of DNS Attacks
DNS attacks differ in their methods and targets. Some manipulate the answers a resolver returns, while others compromise domain administration, conceal malicious traffic, or exhaust infrastructure. Understanding how each attack works helps security teams recognize the right warning signs.
1. DNS Spoofing and Cache Poisoning
DNS spoofing occurs when an attacker supplies false DNS information to misdirect a query. DNS cache poisoning is a related technique in which a recursive resolver accepts and stores a forged DNS response. Other users relying on that cached answer may then be sent to an attacker-controlled IP address until the record expires or the cache is cleared.
How it works:
- A resolver receives a request to look up a domain.
- The attacker attempts to inject a forged response that appears to match the pending query.
- If the resolver accepts the forged answer, it may cache the incorrect record.
- Subsequent queries can return the malicious address instead of the legitimate one.
The attacker may use this redirection to host convincing copies of websites, collect credentials, or intercept sensitive information. A successful poisoning attack can affect multiple users if a shared resolver is compromised.
How to spot it: Investigate when a resolver returns an IP address that does not match the expected authoritative DNS data.
Read more about DNS spoofing and DNS poisoning, and learn how DNSSEC helps validating resolvers reject forged DNS data when the relevant records are correctly signed and validation is enabled. (Note: DNSSEC does not protect against every form of DNS attack)
2. DNS Hijacking (and Its 4 Types)
DNS hijacking occurs when an attacker gains control over DNS resolution or domain settings and changes where queries lead. Unlike cache poisoning, which involves injecting false answers into a resolver’s cache, hijacking often involves compromising the device, router, DNS service, or domain administration account responsible for resolution.
There are four common forms:
- Local hijacking: Malware changes DNS settings on a computer or other device so its queries use an attacker-controlled resolver.
- Router hijacking: An attacker compromises a router and changes its DNS settings, potentially affecting multiple connected devices.
- Man-in-the-middle hijacking: An attacker intercepts DNS queries in transit and attempts to alter responses before they reach the requesting device.
- Rogue DNS server or registrar hijacking: An attacker changes domain nameserver delegations or DNS records through a compromised DNS provider or registrar account.
How it works: The attacker gains access to one of these control points, changes the DNS destination or response path, and directs users toward infrastructure under their control. The resulting redirection may be used for phishing, credential theft, malware delivery, or service disruption.
What the attacker gains: Control over where affected users are sent, with potential access to credentials, sensitive information, or business traffic.
How to spot it: Look for unexpected NS or A record changes, unfamiliar DNS servers configured on devices or routers, and certificate issuance that cannot be explained by authorized activity. Certificate issuance alone does not prove hijacking, but it may warrant investigation.
3. DNS Tunneling
DNS tunneling uses DNS queries and responses to carry data or communications that are not ordinary DNS lookups. Attackers can use this technique to establish command-and-control channels, transfer stolen information, or communicate with compromised systems while blending in with routine network traffic.
How it works: Data is encoded into domain names or DNS record fields, often using subdomains or TXT records. A system under the attacker’s control receives the queries and reconstructs the transmitted information. Depending on the implementation, the tunnel can support two-way communication.
Because DNS is frequently permitted through network security controls, malicious tunneling may be overlooked when organizations do not inspect DNS traffic patterns. However, DNS tunneling is not automatically malicious. Some legitimate security and networking tools also use DNS-based communication.
What the attacker gains: A covert channel for remote control, data exfiltration, or communication with compromised systems.
How to spot it: Look for unusually long or high-entropy subdomain queries, repeated queries to one unfamiliar domain, or a high volume of TXT requests that do not match normal business activity.
DNS security monitoring can help identify suspicious patterns without treating every unusual query as an attack.
4. DNS Amplification Attacks
DNS amplification is a form of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack that exploits DNS servers to send a large volume of traffic toward a victim. It commonly relies on publicly accessible recursive resolvers that respond to requests from arbitrary sources.
How it works:
- The attacker identifies DNS servers that can be abused to generate larger responses than the queries they receive.
- The attacker sends DNS requests with the victim’s source IP address forged into the packet.
- The DNS servers send their responses to the victim rather than to the attacker.
- The combined responses consume the victim’s network bandwidth and may make its services unavailable.
This is known as reflection because third-party DNS servers send the traffic, and amplification. After all, the responses can be larger than the requests. The attack can affect websites, network links, and other internet-facing services.
What the attacker gains: A way to generate disruptive traffic without sending every packet directly from their own infrastructure.
How to spot it: Monitor for unexpected spikes in inbound DNS-related traffic, unusual traffic from multiple DNS servers, and network saturation that coincides with service degradation.
The underlying weakness may be DNS vulnerabilities that allow unrestricted recursive queries.
5. DNS Flood Attacks
A DNS flood attack overwhelms DNS infrastructure with a high volume of queries, exhausting processing capacity or network resources. Attackers may use botnets made up of compromised devices to generate traffic at a rate that a target’s DNS service cannot handle.
How it works: Compromised devices send large numbers of queries to a target DNS service. If the incoming traffic exceeds the service’s capacity, legitimate queries may be delayed, dropped, or left unanswered. Users may then be unable to reach websites or applications that depend on the affected DNS infrastructure.
Not all DNS floods use the same query pattern. Some target authoritative nameservers with large volumes of ordinary-looking requests, while others use random subdomains or exploit reflection and amplification.
What the attacker gains: Service disruption, loss of availability, and potentially a distraction from other malicious activity.
How to spot it: Look for abrupt increases in queries per second, elevated response latency, dropped requests, or a sustained rise in traffic from distributed sources.
DNS floods, amplification attacks, and NXDOMAIN attacks can all contribute to DNS-related DDoS activity, but they differ in their traffic patterns and mechanisms. A direct flood overwhelms a service with queries; amplification reflects larger responses toward a victim; and an NXDOMAIN flood repeatedly requests nonexistent names.
6. NXDOMAIN and Random Subdomain (Water Torture) Attacks
An NXDOMAIN attack targets DNS infrastructure with requests for domain names or subdomains that do not exist. A common variation, called a random subdomain attack or DNS water torture, generates many unpredictable subdomain names to reduce the likelihood that answers are already cached.
How it works:
- The attacker generates a large number of random subdomains under a target domain.
- A botnet or other traffic source sends queries for those names.
- Because the names are new or nonexistent, recursive resolvers may need to forward the requests to authoritative nameservers.
- The volume of repeated lookups consumes server resources and can delay legitimate DNS responses.
This attack is particularly effective when the query pattern bypasses normal caching. The resulting NXDOMAIN response simply indicates that the requested name does not exist. The response itself is not evidence of an attack; the concern is an abnormal volume or pattern of such requests.
What the attacker gains: The ability to degrade or interrupt DNS resolution without needing to change legitimate DNS records.
How to spot it: Investigate sudden spikes in NXDOMAIN responses, unusually high query rates for unique subdomains, and increased load on authoritative nameservers.
7. Subdomain Takeover
A subdomain takeover happens when an attacker claims control of an external service or resource that a domain’s DNS configuration still points to. This commonly occurs when a cloud-hosted application, website, or third-party service is decommissioned but its DNS record remains in place.
How it works:
- A subdomain has a DNS record, often a CNAME, pointing to a third-party service.
- The service or resource is removed, leaving the DNS destination unclaimed.
- An attacker identifies the unclaimed resource and registers or provisions it through the relevant provider.
- The attacker serves content under the organization’s subdomain, potentially using the trusted domain name to make malicious activity appear legitimate.
What the attacker gains: The ability to host unauthorized content under a trusted subdomain. Depending on the service and application, this could support phishing, malware distribution, or attacks against users who trust the organization.
How to spot it: Look for DNS records pointing to services that no longer exist, provider error pages on active subdomains, or unexpected content served through a company-controlled hostname.
A 2021 USENIX Security study by Squarcina and colleagues found takeover vulnerabilities in 1,520 subdomains across 887 domains in the top 50,000 of the Tranco list. This is a study finding, not evidence that 15% of all top 50,000 domains were vulnerable. The paper identified discontinued third-party services as the leading cause among the vulnerable subdomains it examined.
8. Man-in-the-Middle (On-Path) DNS Attacks
A Man-in-the-Middle attack occurs when an attacker can observe or interfere with communications between a device and its DNS resolver. On an untrusted or compromised network, such as a malicious public Wi-Fi hotspot, an attacker may attempt to intercept unencrypted DNS queries or manipulate the responses.
How it works: A device sends a DNS query over a network connection. If an attacker can position themselves on the communication path, they may observe the requested domains or attempt to alter responses before they reach the device. Whether the attack succeeds depends on the network position, transport, and validation mechanisms in use.
What the attacker gains: Potential visibility into DNS activity, opportunities to redirect users, or information that helps support other attacks.
How to spot it: Investigate unexpected DNS responses on a specific network, repeated redirection problems, or suspicious changes that occur only when devices connect through a particular access point.
The use of MTA-STS encrypts email traffic between a client and its resolver, reducing opportunities for on-path interception and tampering. It does not protect every part of the DNS resolution process.
9. DNS Rebinding
DNS rebinding is an attack that abuses how browsers and DNS resolution interact to make a public website origin communicate with systems on a victim’s local network. An attacker controls a domain and changes the IP address returned by its DNS responses, causing the browser to connect to a private or internal address after an initial connection to a public address.
How it works:
- A victim visits a page hosted on an attacker-controlled domain.
- The domain initially resolves to an address serving the attacker’s page.
- The attacker changes the DNS answer so subsequent lookups resolve to an internal IP address.
- If browser and network protections do not block the request, scripts from the page may attempt to communicate with a router, IoT device, or internal administrative service.
The attack can exploit trust relationships between a browser and the site origin, potentially exposing services that are not directly reachable from the public internet. Success depends on browser behavior, DNS caching, network configuration, and the protections implemented by the internal service.
What the attacker gains: Potential access to internal web interfaces or information exposed by vulnerable devices and applications.
How to spot it: Investigate unexpected requests from a public domain to private IP ranges, especially when associated with suspicious browser activity.
DNS rebinding is not simply a forged DNS response. It relies on carefully changing DNS answers to exploit the browser’s access to the victim’s network.
10. Typosquatting and Look-Alike Domains
Typosquatting involves registering a domain name that resembles a legitimate one, often through a spelling variation, an added character, or a different top-level domain. Look-alike domains can be used to impersonate businesses, employees, suppliers, or online services.
This is not an attack on the victim’s DNS infrastructure itself. It is an abuse of the DNS naming system to create a deceptive domain that users may mistake for a legitimate one.
How it works:
- An attacker registers a domain resembling a trusted brand or business partner.
- The attacker configures DNS records, including MX records if the domain will be used for email.
- The domain is used to host a fraudulent website, send phishing messages, or impersonate an executive or supplier.
- Victims may disclose credentials, transfer money, or share sensitive business information.
What the attacker gains: A convincing identity for phishing, business email compromise (BEC), credential theft, and fraud. Publishing MX records does not by itself prove malicious intent, but it can indicate that a look-alike domain is configured to receive email.
How to spot it: Watch for newly registered look-alike domains that begin publishing MX records, especially when the names imitate your brand, executives, or suppliers.
Real-World DNS Attack Examples
Several high-profile security incidents demonstrate how DNS weaknesses and attacks against supporting infrastructure can affect users, businesses, and internet services. The following examples illustrate different attack techniques and the lessons they offer.
1. Kaminsky DNS Cache Poisoning Flaw (2008)
In 2008, security researcher Dan Kaminsky disclosed a serious weakness affecting DNS resolvers. Attackers could send large numbers of forged responses in an attempt to poison a resolver’s cache and redirect users to malicious destinations. The disclosure led to coordinated changes across DNS software and infrastructure, including improved randomization of query source ports.
Lesson: Resolver hardening and DNSSEC validation help defend against forged DNS data. blog.cloudflare.com .
2. Dyn DNS DDoS Attack (2016)
In October 2016, the Mirai botnet was used in a major DDoS attack against Dyn, a DNS provider. The disruption affected access to numerous well-known internet services that relied on Dyn’s infrastructure. Mirai had compromised internet-connected devices, including routers and cameras, and used them to generate attack traffic.
Lesson: DNS availability depends on resilient infrastructure and proactive cloud DDoS protection capable of absorbing multi-terabit volumetric traffic. Connected devices with weak security can quickly be weaponized into botnets to target mission-critical DNS providers.
3. DNS Hijacking Campaigns: Sea Turtle and DNSpionage (2018–2019)
Security researchers documented campaigns in which attackers targeted DNS infrastructure and domain administration processes to redirect traffic. The Sea Turtle campaign involved compromising DNS-related accounts and infrastructure, while DNSpionage used DNS hijacking as part of broader espionage activity. These operations showed that attackers could target trusted domain resolution rather than only individual computers.
Lesson: Domain registrars, DNS providers, and nameserver configurations must be treated as critical security assets. Unexpected changes to domain delegation require prompt investigation.
4. MyEtherWallet DNS/BGP Hijacking Incident (2018)
In April 2018, users attempting to access the cryptocurrency service MyEtherWallet were redirected to a fraudulent website during an incident involving BGP route hijacking and DNS infrastructure. The incident highlighted how attacks against internet routing and name resolution can combine to make a malicious destination appear legitimate.
Lesson: DNS security must be considered alongside routing security, certificate validation, and the protection of accounts and sensitive transactions.
5. SAD DNS Cache Poisoning Attack (2020)
In November 2020, researchers disclosed SAD DNS, a technique that used a side channel involving network behavior to revive DNS cache poisoning attacks against vulnerable resolvers. The research showed that improvements introduced after the 2008 Kaminsky disclosure did not eliminate every possible cache poisoning technique.
Lesson: DNS defenses must evolve as researchers uncover new attack methods. Keep DNS software updated and use DNSSEC validation where supported.
How to Detect a DNS Attack
DNS attacks do not always cause an immediate outage. Some quietly redirect users, establish hidden communication channels, or prepare a domain for phishing. Monitoring changes and unusual DNS activity can help identify a problem before it causes wider damage.
Watch for these warning signs:
- Unexpected NS, A, AAAA, or MX record changes. Check whether the changes were authorized and whether they match the intended configuration.
- Unrequested certificate issuance. Investigate unfamiliar certificates associated with your domains, particularly when combined with other suspicious activity.
- Sudden query-volume spikes. A sharp increase in requests or NXDOMAIN responses may indicate a flood or random-subdomain attack.
- Unusual encoded or lengthy subdomains. Repeated, high-entropy queries to unfamiliar domains may indicate DNS tunneling.
- Users landing on the wrong website. Compare resolver responses with authoritative records and investigate unexpected redirects.
- Unexpected DNS configuration changes on devices or routers. These can indicate local or router hijacking.
None of these signals independently proves an attack. Changes may have legitimate explanations, so investigate the timing, source, scope, and context before concluding.
Continuous DNS security monitoring turns changes and anomalous activity into actionable alerts. For a manual check, use our DNS record lookup tool to inspect published records. If you suspect an active incident, preserve relevant logs and escalate the investigation to your security team.
Impact of DNS Attacks
DNS attacks can affect more than the availability of a website. Their impact depends on the technique used, the systems compromised, and how quickly the incident is detected.
- Business downtime: Floods and DDoS attacks can prevent legitimate users from resolving domain names, interrupting access to websites, applications, and other online services.
- Data theft and unauthorized access: Spoofing, hijacking, and tunneling can support credential theft, data exfiltration, or access to sensitive systems.
- Phishing and fraud: Look-alike domains and malicious redirection can make fraudulent websites or emails appear trustworthy, increasing the risk of credential theft and business email compromise.
- Brand and reputational damage: Customers may lose confidence in an organization after being redirected to malicious sites or receiving fraudulent communications that appear to come from the business.
- Incident response costs: Organizations may need to investigate the attack, restore DNS configurations, contain compromised systems, communicate with affected users, and recover disrupted services.
How to Prevent DNS Attacks
DNS attack prevention requires controls that match the technique being used. DNSSEC helps validate DNS data, registrar security reduces the risk of unauthorized domain changes, and traffic monitoring can reveal suspicious queries. No single control prevents every type of DNS attack.
Use the following table as a starting point for matching common attacks with relevant safeguards.
| Attack Type | Recommended Control |
|---|---|
| DNS spoofing and cache poisoning | DNSSEC signing and validation |
| DNS hijacking | Registrar lock, MFA, and restricted account access |
| DNS amplification | Restrict open recursion and apply rate limiting |
| DNS floods | DDoS mitigation and resilient DNS infrastructure |
| NXDOMAIN attacks | Query filtering and rate limiting |
| Subdomain takeover | Remove dangling DNS records |
| DNS tunneling | DNS query monitoring and filtering |
| On-path DNS attacks | MTA-STS, encrypted DNS transport |
| DNS rebinding | Network segmentation and controls on internal services |
| Look-alike domains | Domain monitoring and DMARC enforcement |
Organizations should also monitor changes to authoritative DNS records, review registrar and DNS provider access regularly, and remove records that point to decommissioned services. A free DNSSEC checker can help verify the status of DNSSEC for a domain, but a successful check does not establish that every aspect of DNS security is configured correctly.
Email authentication is equally important when attackers use look-alike domains or hijacked domains to impersonate trusted senders. Implementing DMARC, SPF, and DKIM helps receiving mail systems authenticate messages. A DMARC policy of p=reject, when correctly implemented and supported by aligned authentication, instructs receivers to reject messages that fail DMARC evaluation, although enforcement behavior depends on the receiving system.
For the full step-by-step list, see our DNS security best practices checklist.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the most common DNS attack?
There is no single DNS attack that is universally the most common. DNS-based threats include spoofing, hijacking, tunneling, and denial-of-service attacks. Their prevalence varies by industry, network exposure, and reporting methodology. Organizations should monitor DNS activity and prioritize defenses based on their infrastructure and threat exposure.
What are two types of attacks used on DNS open resolvers?
Two common attack techniques involving open DNS resolvers are amplification and reflection, which abuse resolver responses to direct traffic toward a victim, and resource-exhaustion attacks, which overwhelm DNS services with excessive queries. Open resolvers can expose infrastructure to abuse when recursion is available to unauthorized clients.
What is the difference between DNS spoofing and DNS hijacking?
DNS spoofing involves supplying false DNS responses, while cache poisoning occurs when a resolver accepts and stores a forged answer. DNS hijacking involves taking control of DNS settings, records, or resolution processes to redirect traffic. Both can send users to malicious destinations, but the attacker’s method and the affected control point differ.
Can DNSSEC stop all DNS attacks?
No. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication and integrity for DNS data, helping validating resolvers detect forged responses. It does not prevent every attack, including DDoS floods, DNS tunneling, or unauthorized changes made through compromised registrar accounts. DNSSEC must be correctly deployed and validated to provide its intended protection.
Final Words
DNS attacks can compromise traffic routing, expose sensitive information, and disrupt the services customers rely on. Recognizing the different attack techniques helps security teams investigate suspicious activity and select appropriate controls. Start by reviewing your domain configuration, access controls, and DNS activity today.
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